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Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-Power of State to Apportion Tax among Benefi-
ciaries under Will-[New York].-A testatrix who had been a resident of New York
and had drawn her will there did not make any provision in it for the apportionment
of estate taxes. A New York statute provided that in the absence of such a provision
these taxes should be ratably apportioned among the "persons interested in the es-
tate." Upon an accounting and before distribution to the beneficiaries, the executors,
acting in accordance with the New York statute, requested a determination of the
question of apportionment from the surrogate. The specific legatees urged that the
New York statute was in conflict with the provisions of the federal estate tax statute2
and that it violated the supremacy and due process clauses of the Federal Constitu-
tion. The surrogate overruled these objections and ordered apportionment in accord-
ance with the state law. On direct appeal to the Court of Appeals,3 held, that the tax
was to be paid out of the residue. Judgment reversed, three judges dissenting. In re
del Drago's Estate.4
Since the testatrix had made no provision for the payment of estate taxes, the
court was confronted with the question of which legislative determination of the
testatrix's presumed intention was to close this gap in her will.' The majority of the
court found that Congress had expressed an intent that payment was to be made
from the residuary estate; since enforcement of the inconsistent state statute would
violate the supremacy clause of the Constitution and the doctrine of uniformity, the
federal estate tax statute was controlling. The minority was of the opinion that the
state statute, which provided that ". ... proration shall be made by the surrogate in
the proportion .... that the value of the property, interest or benefit of each ....
person bears to the total value of the property .... ," ought to control.
Regulation of the distribution of decedents' estates through wills and intestacy
statutes is part of the law of property and, as such, subject to regulation by the
states. Traditionally, rules of apportionment and abatement among heirs and next
of kin, legatees and devisees, general and specific beneficiaries, specific and residuary
beneficiaries have been defined exclusively by the states.7 The Constitution does not
I N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 124. The term "persons interested in
the estate" is precisely defined in N.Y. Tax Law (McKinney, 1939) §§ 249me(g), 249r.
Pennsylvania has a similar apportionment statute. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I94i) tit.
20, § 844.
2 53 Stat. iig et seq. (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ Soo et seq. (i94o).
3 Because of the constitutional question involved direct appeal was had "as of right."
N.Y. Const. (McKinney, 1939) art. 6, § 7(3).
4 38 N.E. (2d) 131 (N.Y. 1941), cert. granted io U.S.L. Week 3295 (1942).
s "Experience shows that the same sort of gaps occur again and again. For the filling in of
such typical gaps, the law keeps in stock ready made rules of statutory or judge-made law,
which are invoked whenever the gap in a will occurs ....... Rheinstein, Law of Inheritance
138 (1938); see 2 Page, Wills §§ 914, 917 (3d ed. 1941); 4 ibid., at § 15o4. When a court
deals with a legislative presumption, although it may be clearer than a judicial presumption,
the court's language must be carefully perused. The court is applying a general rule of prop-
erty law, but it may deal with the problem as if it were construing a will, although not en-
deavoring to ascertain the testator's intention.
6 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 124.1.
7 1 Page, Wills § 24 (3d ed. 1941).
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expressly grant the power to regulate successions to the Federal Government; if such
federal power exists, it must be implied from the congressional taxing power. It is
therefore pertinent to inquire whether the power of Congress to levy an inheritance
tax' includes the power to regulate the descent and distribution of decedents' estates.
In Knowlton v. Moore,9 it was held that Congress had the power to levy a tax on suc-
cessions. Mr. Justice White said, "The thing forming the universal subject of taxation
upon which inheritance and legacy taxes rest is the transmission or receipt, and not
the right existing to regulate."'1 The tax in that case was a legacy tax and the Court
said, ...... this is a burden cast upon the recipient and not upon the power of the
State to regulate."" The Court analogized that tax to the stamp duty in property
conveyances,' 2 obviously regarding the tax under attack as one of the lighter, revenue
producing taxes. 3 To-day, on the other hand, estate taxes are so large4 that they
influence to a considerable extent the conduct of those who have property to dis-
tribute. The increase in the rates of estate taxation has resulted in regulation's whether
or not Congress intended that result. To go beyond this regulation incidental to its
power to tax and say that Congress has the power, regardless of the size of the estate
tax, to establish a legislative determination of presumed intention of the testator,
when a testator has expressed no intention, is to leave the sound limits of the taxing
power. In Knowlton v. Moore the notion that the state had the exclusive power to tax
successions was exploded; the states, however, have retained the exclusive power to
regulate the descent and distribution of decedents' estates.
Historically the states' power to regulate estates" is secure. Hamilton, the arch-
advocate of federal power, used regulation of successions by Congress as an example
of excessive federal power. 6 When the first Judiciary Act was being considered, a long
report by Edmund Randolph, first Attorney General, held that definition of the rights
8 Inheritance tax is a generic term, including two specific forms: the legacy tax and the
estate tax. For a history of inheritance taxation and a discussion of its two types, see Schultz,
Inheritance Taxation, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 43 (1932).
9 178 U.S. 41 (goo). lo Ibid., at 59. Ibid., at 6o.
X2 "If the proposition here contended for be sound, such property or dealings in relation
thereto cannot be taxed by Congress, even in the form of a stamp duty." Ibid.
13 "It is not denied that, subject to a compliance with the limitations in the Constitution,
the taxing power of Congress extends to all the usual objects of taxation." Ibid., at 58. In
Congress also this stamp tax analogy was made: "Each State has full control over the law of
descent and distribution, and can say who shall receive a share in the property of the decedent.
The United States has no such power. It has the power to impose excise taxes, such as a
reasonable stamp upon a deed for the transfer of property, and probably this so-called inheri-
tance tax will be supported in law as a tax." 53 Cong. Rec. App. x499 (Xgi6).
14 Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 22 (1940); Magill,
Federal Regulation of Family Settlements, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 265 (1937).
's "Federal regulation of inheritance is a reality today, not so much because of the collec-
tion of taxes out of large estates, as because of what is done to avoid the collection. Congress
passed a revenue statute without amending the elements of human nature ..... It regulated
inheritance without purposing to do so ..... " Cahn, Federal Regulation of Inheritance,
88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 297, 311 (1940).
i6 The Federalist, No. XXXI, at 2o6 (Dawson ed. x863). When the example was used the
writer conceded that it was one "which indeed cannot easily be imagined."
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of property was reserved to the states.17 It was in the case of Armstrong v. Lear5 that
Mr. Justice Story instituted the policy that federal courts will not entertain jurisdiction
in matters of probate even in diversity of citizenship cases. 9 While Congress and the
federal courts shied away from these matters, the state legislatures have enacted stat-
utes regulating wills and intestacy and especially the abatement of legacies and mar-
shalling of assets.20 What assets belong to an estate, to be taxed by the Federal Gov-
ernment, is determined by state law. When cases involving taxes on property rights
defined by the states come before the federal courts, they do not sit "in appellate ca-
pacity" in determining the property rights involved. Under the former legacy tax
statute2' and under the present federal estate tax statute2s courts have stated time and
time again that the state is the regulator of successions.
If Congress intended to effect any "regulation" of descent and distribution of es-
tates by enacting the estate tax statute, this "regulation" did not extend beyond some
broad concept of splitting of large fortunes and redistributing wealth.24 To achieve
this end Congress would not be required to enact minute statutory directions with
particular attention to the actual mechanics of devolution. It can hardly be assumed
that Congress attempted such a regulation by a provision which would merely affect
the apportionment of the estate tax between the residuary legatee and the specific
legatees, leaving the apportionment of the tax in cases of intestacy or of insufficiency
of the residue either to the state or without any regulation.2s Furthermore, it is un-
likely that Congress would undertake a regulation which, concededly, yields to a regu-
lation made by the testator. Such regulation as may be achieved through the taxing
power is to serve the public interest as understood by Congress. Therefore, to allow an
individual an independent right to adopt a different intention is to be inconsistent. A
regulation which overrides state power but yields to individual power would be a
strange anomaly.
"7Am. State Papers, Misc. No. 17, at (26) (179o).
1 12 Wheat. (U.S.) i69 (1827); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876); cf. De Vaughn
v. Hutchinson, I65 U.S. 566 (1897).
'9 Cahn, op. cit. supra note is, at 3o, 302 n. 2o; i Moore, Federal Practice § 207, at 211
(1938); 3 ibid., at § 101.3, at 3481.
20 See Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, I70 U.S. 283 (i896). Furthermore, the
states' power in this field is not limited by state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity
and equality of taxation. Ibid., at 288.
"i Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § i.ii (1942).
in considering the power of Congress to impose death duties, we eliminate all
thought of a greater privilege to do so than exists as to any other form of taxation, as the right
to regulate successions is vested in the States and not in Congress." Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 58 (igoo).
'3 In Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 6r, 63 (1924), Mr. Justice Holmes said, .... the dis-
tribution of the burden of taxation among the several beneficiaries is a matter of state regula-
tion .......
24 Cahn, op. cit. supra note i5; Magill, op. cit. supra note 14.
2"Mr. Justice Holmes remarked, "As to intestate successors the tax is not imposed upon
them but precedes them and the fact that they may receive less or different sums because of
the statute does not concern the United States." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (i921).
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An examination of the statute itself does not indicate any intention of Congress
that the residuary legatee should bear the burden of the estate tax. The Clarke Amend-
ment, now incorporated as Section 826(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, provides for
reimbursement for ".... . the tax or any part .... paid by, or collected out of that
part of the estate passing to or in possession of, any person other than the execu-
tor .... 26 to any legatee or devisee from the undistributed part of the estate or from
shares which ordinarily would have abated in prior order. This provision might seem
to lend weight to the argument that Congress intended payment to be made from the
residuary estate. Similarly the words ".... it being the purpose and intent ....
that so far as practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the
tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution .... ,27 could lead to this
conclusion. Other factors must be taken into consideration, however. First, there
is the statutory direction that"... . just and equitable contribution ... ." be made
to the legatee who has paid all or part of the federal tax. These words contain a sug-
gestion of proration2 8 The Clarke Amendment also provides for reimbursement by
" .... persons whose interest in the estate of the decedent would have been reduced
if the tax had been paid before the distribution of the estate or whose interest is sukiect
to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes, debts, or other charges against the
estate ..... ,,-9 This clause must refer to local law since the federal act does not list
the interests which are subject to prior liability. The state law defining the order or
extent of abatement controls. Furthermore, residuary collection is feasible only in
those cases where a residuary estate exists.
In addition to the incorporation of state law in the Clarke Amendment, references
to local rules are made in other portions of the act. Deductions may be made from the
gross estate for such funeral and administration expenses, losses, indebtedness, and
taxes "as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction."o Furthermore, the "law of the
jurisdiction under which the estate is administered" is invoked when determining the
amount deductible as a gift to a charity.3' These elements of control, specifically given
to a state, which affect the amount of the federal revenue are far more significant than
the determination of the ultimate incidence of the tax.
Proration was specifically included in the federal act in the provision dealing with
reimbursement to the executor by the beneficiary when insurance funds are transferred
at death.32 This addition to the federal statute could be interpreted in two ways. It
might indicate a congressional interest in proration.33 On the other hand, it might
indicate that all other apportionment was excluded by limiting apportionment to this
type of beneficiary.34
The language of the statute is too indefinite to allow the conclusion that Congress
36 53 Stat. 128 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 826(b) (194o). v TIbid.
29 Conf. Rep. 12oo, 64 th Cong. xst Sess., at 1 (1916).
29 53 Stat. 128 (x939), 26 U.S.C.A. 826(b) (z94o) (italics added).
30 53 Stat 123-24 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 812(b) (394o).
" 53 Stat. 124-25 (x939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 812(d) (I94O).
3' 53 stat. 128 (I939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 826(c) (I940).
33 1 Paul, op. cit. supra note 2x, at § 13.54.
34 Karch, op. cit. supra note 14, at 25. In Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 134, i4o N.E.
686, 687 (1923), the court used this argument.
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intended to undertake any regulation of the apportionment of the tax, and still less
that it intended to impose the entire tax upon the residuary legatee.s Moreover, a
court will not presume that Congress intended to exercise a power which is constitu-
tionally doubtful36 without an express statement.
Likewise the congressional debates do not contain any clear statement that Con-
gress intended to regulate the apportionment of the estate tax among the heirs or
beneficiaries. On the contrary, in their deliberations on the tax bill the legislators
made numerous statements which indicate that they knew they might be tampering
with a field traditionally reserved to the states.37 In the Revenue Act of xgi638 the
shift from a legacy tax to an estate tax was not made for the purpose of changing the
incidence of the federal tax, but rather to simplify collection and to save the federal
tax authorities the trouble of pursuing individual legatees and devisees.39 The primary
concern of Congress was revenue, not regulation of descent and distribution of dece-
dents' estates.4o
It was during these debates that a member invited the House to consider the very
problem of determining who should bear the burden of the tax.41 Since this invitation
went unaccepted it may be assumed either that those who had spoken in favor of state
regulation did not think the states' control was being invaded, or that Congress was
not interested in considering who was to be the burden bearer. More positively, Mr.
Cordell Hull, then a member of the House, stated, "Under the general laws of descent
3 For example, in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Suydam, 125 N.J. Eq. 458, 463, 6 A. (2d)
392, 395 (i939), the court said, "..... the Federal estate tax is treated as though it were levied
proportionately on all the assets entering into the assessment." (Italics added.) In Ericson
v. Childs, i24 Conn. 66, 77, ig Atl. 176, i81 (1938), it was held that former decisions referring
to the federal statute were" .... based upon a presumed intent found in the federal estate tax,
that there should be an apportionment of the tax burden ..... " (Italics added.)
36 See the minority opinion in Snowden's Estate, 25 Pitt. L. J. (o. s.) 81 (Orphan's Ct.
Allegheny Co., Pa. I878), cited in Karch, op. cit. supra note 14, at 34.
37 "We must always bear in mind the varying conditions in the different States, their trend
toward taxation in general and toward special taxation in particular, their wealth, develop-
ment, and the character of their people." 53 Cong. Rec. App. i4o6 (xgi6). "The things that
affect us in our everyday life can be better performed by the States and municipalities, because
they are nearer to the public. Through their personal touch and intimat6 knowledge, local
officials can better discharge their duties and obligations to the people than the Federal offi-
cials, who are far removed from the home life of the average citizen and who are more chiefly
concerned with formulation and initiating our foreign and domestic policies." Ibid., at 1708.
".... instead of surrendering to the Federal Government matters of local concern, as has be-
come the custom of late, we should resist every effort which, if successful, will deprive the
State of exercising power and control over matters inherently local." Ibid., at 1o9.
3 39 Stat. 777 (i9i6).
39 53 Cong. Rec. 1o656-57 (1916); H.R. Rep. 922, 64 th Cong. ist Sess., at 3 (Igi6);
Greely, Estate Tax Apportionment in New York, 70 J. of Accountancy 309, 310 (1940);
see Matter of Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (I919).
4' Calm, op. cit. supra note 15; cf. Magill, op. cit. supra note 14. Although Congress and
the Treasury Department have not shown an intense interest beyond revenue, indirectly
effective regulation actually exists. The regulation, however, is a general policy favoring re-
distribution of wealth rather than any articulate regulation expressed in stated rules.
4X 53 Cong. Rec. App. 1495 (1916).
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the proposed estate tax would be first taken out of the net estate before distribution
and distribution made under the same rule that would otherwise govern it."42 These words
do not express an intention to invade the state field of regulation of successions, nor
do they hold that the federal estate tax be paid only out of the residuary estate when
one exists. On the contrary, the words indicate an intention to leave the state power
to regulate successions unimpaired, with the exception that the estate tax must first
be paid to the Federal Government. Furthermore, although the insurance proration
provision has been used to indicate that Congress thought of proration, actually the
clause was inserted without any such thought. The main evil Congress sought to
remedy was an evasion of estate taxes by testators who made testamentary gifts di-
rectly to beneficiaries by the insurance device.43 In considering the Clarke Amend-
ment it is significant that it was adopted without Congressional comment. Supporters
of state regulation had shown intense interest in state control of successions; they
would certainly have commented on the fact if they had felt that the measure substi-
tuted federal regulation.
In the administration of estates some state courts have held that the federal statute
provided for proration;44 others were convinced that it imposed the burden upon the
residue;4s still others, believing that the federal statute expressed no intention, deter-
mined the problem on the basis of the state rules.41 It was to protect residuary legatees
4 53 Cong. Rec. 10657 (1916) (italics added). The remainder of Mr. Hull's statement
was, "Where the decedent makes a will he can allow the estate tax to fasten on his net estate
in the same manner, or if he objects to this equitable method of imposing it upon the entire net
estate before distribution he can insert a residuary clause or other provision in his will, the
effect of which would more or less change the incidence of the tax." In these words writers have
perceived an intent that the tax be paid out of the residue. See i Paul, op. cit. supra note 21,
at § 13.54.
43 "It has been brought to the attention of the committee that wealthy persons have and
now anticipate resorting to this method of defeating the estate tax." H.R. Rep. 767, 65
Cong. 2d Sess., at 22 (i918).
44 Commercial Trust Co. v. Millard, 122 N.J. Eq. 290, 193 Atl. 814 (I937); Gaede v.
Carroll, 114 N.J. Eq. 524, 169 Atl. 172 (1933); Hampton's Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky.
199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920); Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, o3 AtI. 308 (i918). But see Turner v.
Cole, iz8 N.J. Eq. 497, 179 Atl. 113 (I935).
4S Matter of Oakes, 248 N.Y. 280, 162 N.E. 79 (1928); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Win-
throp, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924), cert. den. 266 U.S. 633 (1924); Bemis v. Converse,
246 Mass. 131, 14o N.E. 686 (1923).
46 Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924). The courts' reasoning is well illustrated in
Hepburn v. Winthrop, 65 App. D.C. 309, 315, 83 F. (2d) 566, 572 (1936): The estate tax
"is taken from the estate before the property is set off to the beneficiaries. It is therefore not
a payment as to which the beneficiaries have any concern. It is not a charge against either
legatees or distributees. But appellants say that .... it is payable out of residue; and here,
they say, the residue consists of both real and personal property, and that each should bear
its share of the burden. There is a reasonableness to this which Congress might very well have
considered, but we think the answer is that Congress left the question open to action either
by the testator in the will or by the states through statute." In the absence of a statute or any
direction from the testator the court followed common law precedents-charging the person-
alty of the residue first. Again, in Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 476,
124 N.E. 265, 267 (1919), the court said, "The benefaction conferred by the residuary clause
of a will is only of that which remains after all paramount claims upon the estate of the testator
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who were likely to be the closer relatives of a testator that the New York Decedent
Estates Commission recommended a change in the usual common law rule which im-
posed the burden of taxes as administration expenses on the residue.47 In making this
recommendation, it is not surprising that this commission accepted the dictum in
Edwards v. SlocUln,48 in which the federal court followed the New York courts' rule
that the federal tax was payable out of the residuary estate, but recognized it as a
state judicial regulation, not a federal statutory direction.49 The court said that the
Federal Government does not care who pays the tax; "if the legatees and devisees
cannot agree as to the burden bearing, the state courts can settle the matter."O
Trusts--Powers and Obligations of Trustees-Personal Liability of Trustee upon
Contract within Powers as Trustee-[Montana].-The defendant trust company was
required by the terms of the trust to support the trustor's daughter for life. This
daughter became an invalid in 1933 and from that .time until her death was cared
for by her step-sister, with the consent of the defendant trustee. The step-sister as-
signed her claim for these services to the plaintiff, who brought suit against the de-
fendant personally. On the defendant's demurrer the suit was dismissed by the trial
court, and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, that a trustee is not
personally liable upon contracts within his authority as trustee and may be sued only
in his representative capacity. Judgment affirmed. ThItle v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,
This decision is contrary to the rule followed in most states that a trustee is per-
sonally liable upon contracts within his authority unless he has stipulated to the con-
trary,2 and it appears to be the first case in which the trustee's personal liability has
been denied in the absence of a specific statutory basis for liability in his representa-
tive capacity.3 While the court relied in part on a Montana statute4 declaring a trustee
are satisfied ..... The tax is a pecuniary burden or imposition laid upon the estate ..... In
its nature it is superior to the claims of the residuary legatee. Since neither the Act of Congress
nor the will and codicils make any other provision for the point of ultimate incidence of this
tax, it must rest on the residue of the estate." (Italics added.) See also Matter of Hamlin,
226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919).
47 Combined Reports of Commission to Investigate Defects in Laws of Estates 338 (reprint
ed. 1928-33); 1 Paul, op. cit. supra note 21, at § 13.54. "In many cases estate taxes have com-
pletely exhausted the residuary estate, and those whom that testator desired most to benefit
have received nothing." Greely, op. cit. supra note 39, at 309.
48 264 U.S. 61 (1924), affirming Edwards v. Slocum, 287 Fed. 651, 653 (C.C.A. 2d 1923),
where judge Hough said, "So far as the words of this statute are concerned, the United States
does not care who ultimately bear the weight of this tax: it announces the sum and demands
payment from the executors .......
49 Edwards v. Slocum, 2$7 Fed. 651, 655 (C.C.A. 2d 1923).
so Ibid., at 653. This rule has been recently expressed in Northern Trust Co. v. Harrison,
125 F. (2d) 893 (C.C.A. 7th 1942).
'119 P. (2d) 884 (Mont. 194).
'Peyser v. American Security Trust Co., 70 App. D.C. 349, 107 F. (2d) 625 (I939); Kincaid
v. Hensel, 185 Wash. 503, 55 P. (2d) 1050 (1936); 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 712 (1935).
3 Notes 27 and 28 infra.
4 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1936) § 7914; see § 7968, which pro-
vides that ordinarily an agent is not personally liable to third persons.
